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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
IN RE:
REVOCATION OF BEER AND LIQUOR
LICENSE AND BUSINESS REVENUE
LICENSE
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 890517-CA

vs.
THE CLUB, THE ALAMO, LIQUID
ASSETS, INC., THE CLUB/449 MAIN,
FOUR FORTY-NINE, a non-profit
corporation, THERESE M. LAWTON,
KEITH BRONSTEIN, ANNE ALLENDE,
MIKE STEMLER, BILL DAHLQUIST,
CHRIS JAMES, SONNY SUNDQUIST,
DOUG WATCHHORN, and any other
person claiming a management or
ownership interest in the above
mentioned establishments or
organizations,

Category No. 14b

Defendants-Appellants.
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the district court's dismissal of the
Club/Alamo's 1 appeal of "The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Order By The Park City Council" (hereinafter cited as
"Ruling") entered by the Park City Council in a license revocation
proceeding.

1
For convenience, appellants in this appeal will be referred
to throughout this brief as the "Club/Alamo," the private clubs
that were the subject of the license revocation proceeding in Park
City that gives rise to this appeal.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (b) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the district
court erred in dismissing the Club/Alamo's appeal of the decision
of the Park City Council in a license revocation proceeding
initiated against the Club/Alamo by Park City.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Relevant text of constitutional and statutory provisions
pertinent to the resolution of the issue presented on appeal is
contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In June 1988, the City Manager of Park City, through the City
Manager Designee, Larry R. Keller, initiated proceedings before
the Park City Council under certain ordinances of Park City
(hereafter "City") to revoke the liquor and beer licenses and
business licenses issued by the City to the Club/Alamo for the
year 1988. (R. 301-305)
The Council

referred

the matter to a licensed

hearing

examiner, A. Robert Thurman, for the taking of evidence and the
preparation of recommended findings of fact and conclusions of
law, and a recommended order.

After the receipt of evidence,

submission of briefs, and presentation of oral argument, the
hearing examiner filed his recommendations with the Council on
February 13, 1989 (R. 600 at pp. 1-28).
2

He ultimately recommended

dismissal of the revocation action against the Club/Alamo (R. 600
at pp. 23-28).
After receiving a motion to dismiss from the Club/Alamo and
additional briefing and oral argument from the parties, and upon
considering the hearing examiner's recommendations, the Council
issued its findings of fact/ conclusions of law, and order on
March 9, 1989. Ruling (R. 55-64) (a copy of which is contained in
Appendix A ) .

Although the Council,

lf

[b]ased on equitable

considerations and on the feeling that no useful purpose would be
served by levying sanctions against the [Club/Alamo]," dismissed
the "Order to Show Cause" filed against those establishments, it
ruled that the Club/Alamo were in violation of certain of the
liquor/beer license and business license ordinances.
10

(R. 61-64).

Specifically, the Council

Ruling at 7-

ruled that the

Club/Alamo had violated P.C. Ordin. 83-16 § 6.01(b)2, which
provides:
L i c e n s e s i s s u e d under t h i s ordinance may be
suspended or revoked by the City Council for
the following r e a s o n s :

(b) The l i c e n s e e or employees of the
l i c e n s e e h a v e b e e n c o n v i c t e d or
p l e a d [ s i c ] g u i l t y to v i o l a t i o n s
occurring under Section 7.01 of t h i s
o r d i n a n c e on t h e l i c e n s e d premise,
n o t i n c l u d i n g v i o l a t i o n s by
patrons[.]

2
Citations to "P.C. Ordin." are to the ordinances of Park City.
3

Section 7.01 sets forth conduct that constitutes "Offenses of
Licensee," which are punishable as a class B misdemeanor, see 8316 § 7.03,.

It also ruled that the Club/Alamo had violated P.C.

Ordin. 87-12 § 15(3), which provides that the City Council may
suspend or revoke a business license if the City Council finds
that

"the business

is a front for or the site of illegal

activity" (the full text of the pertinent portion of § 15 is
contained in Appendix B ) .
The Club/Alamo then filed an appeal from the Councilfs ruling
in district court 3 (R. 1-52).

In that appeal, the Club/Alamo

argued that (1) the Council did not have the authority to perform
the administrative function of license revocation; (2) the Park
City ordinances regulating the service, sale, and storage of
liquor by a "private club" are invalid on the ground of preemption
by state law; (3) the Council erroneously found the Club/Alamo in
violation of P.C. Ordin. 83-16 § 6.01(b) by construing that
provision in a manner inconsistent with its plain language; (4)
P.C. Ordin. 87-12 § 15(3) is unconstitutionally vague, or,
alternatively, is constitutional only if construed and applied in
the manner

suggested

by the hearing examiner; and

(5) the

Council's treatment of "The Club" and "The Alamo" as a single

3
The Utah Court of Appeals no longer has primary appellate
jurisdiction over appeals from the final orders of local agencies
in adjudicative proceedings. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2) (a) (Supp. 1989) with former Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (a)
(1987) . The district court conducts the initial review in such
cases, and this Court reviews the district court's decision.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(b) (Supp. 1989).
4

business entity for purposes of the license revocation proceeding,
even though separate beer and liquor licenses and business
licenses are issued to each by the Cityf violated Park City's
ordinances and denied the licensees equal protection of the law
(R. 21-51).
appeal

The City responded by filing a motion to dismiss the

(R. 556-564),

The district court granted the City's

motion, ruling that the court nlack[ed] jurisdiction of the appeal
for the reason that appellants lack standing to appeal and that
the issues sought to be raised on appeal herein are moot" (R. 582583)

(a copy of the district court's order is contained in

Appendix C ) .
The Club/Alamo filed the instant appeal from the district
court's order dismissing their appeal (R. 585).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts pertinent to this appeal are contained in the
Statement Of The Case, above.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Because the Club/Alamo were aggrieved by the Council's order,
they were properly before the district court on appeal pursuant to
the applicable Park City ordinances.
Alternatively, the district court had jurisdiction to review
the Council's unlawful actions under Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b)(2).
Finally, because the requested judicial relief can affect the
rights of the Club/Alamo, their appeal to the district court
should not have been dismissed as moot*
5

ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
CLUB/ALAMO'S APPEAL FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION;
THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE APPEAL,
WHICH RAISED ISSUES THAT WERE NOT MOOT, UNDER
P.C. ORDIN. 83-16 § 6,01m. AND P.C. ORDIN. 8712 § 15, OR, ALTERNATIVELY, UNDER UTAH R. CIV.
P. 65B(b)(2).
When filing their initial appeal in the district court, the
Club/Alamo asserted as a basis for appellate jurisdiction in that
court the provisions of P.C. Ordin. 83-16 § 6.01m. and P.C. Ordin.
87-12 § 15, or, alternatively, Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b) (2) (R. 23) .

The district court rejected those bases for jurisdiction,

accepting the City's argument that the Club/Alamo lacked appellate
standing because they were not "licensee[s] aggrieved by an Order
of the City Council," as required by 83-16 § 6.01m and 87-12 § 15,
and because Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b)(2) could not be used as a
substitute

for seeking review of the case by a declaratory

judgment action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 et seq.
(1987) 4 (a copy of the City's memorandum in support of its motion
to dismiss is contained in Appendix D) .

The court's conclusion,

like the City's arguments on this point, was founded on an
4
Although the district court's order does not articulate the
City's arguments as grounds for the court's conclusion that the
Club/Alamo lacked standing to appeal, it is clear from the minute
entry the court issued prior to its signing of the order prepared
by the City that the court had adopted the City's arguments in
their entirety.
See Minute Entry (R. 580) ("The Court grants
Appellee's Motion to Dismiss for reasons advanced by the Appellee
Park City Municipal Corp."). Therefore, subsequent references in
this brief to the district court's conclusions are necessarily
also references to the arguments advanced by the City in the
district court.
6

unreasonably narrow construction of the pertinent Park City
ordinances and a failure to recognize traditional avenues of
appellate review of administrative decisions.
P.C. Ordin. 83-16 § 6.01m. 5 provides:
Any licensee aggrieved by an Order of the City
Council entered pursuant to this section may
maintain an action for relief therefrom in any
court of competent jurisdiction, where said
court deems itself the appropriate forum for
the appeal from the City Council's action.
The licensee shall be required to follow
orders and procedures of the appropriate court
with regard to time for filing.
A similarly worded provision is contained in P.C. Ordin. 87-12 §
15, the Park City ordinance dealing with the revocation and
suspension of business licenses issued by the City.

Central to

the district court's conclusion that the Club/Alamo lacked
appellate standing is the claim that they were not "aggrieved" by
the "Order of the City Council."

It accepted the City's position

that the Club/Alamo received in the Council's order everything
they requested—i.e., a dismissal of the action—and thus, as a
"prevailing" party, were not entitled to appeal under the Park
City ordinances.

Such a position ignores the basis upon which the

Council

its order

issued

of dismissal

and argues

for an

unreasonably narrow construction of the terms "aggrieved" and
"Order" as used in 83-16 § 6.01m and 87-12 § 15.

5
P.C. Ordin. 83-16 § 6.01 deals with the suspension and
revocation of liquor and beer licenses issued by the City.
Section 6.01m specifically addresses appellate review of an order
of the City under section 6.01.
7

Although the Club/Alamo admittedly received the dismissal
they requested, that dismissal was not grounded on factual and
legal conclusions exonerating the licensees of guilt, but rather
on the Council's "equitable considerations and . . . feeling that
no useful purpose v/ould be served by levying sanctions against the
establishments known as 'The Club1 and
Ruling at 9 (emphasis added).

'The Alamo' . . . ."

The Council specifically found that

the Club/Alamo were in violation of P.C. Ordin. 83-16 §6.01(b) and
P.C. Ordin. 87-12 § 15 and were therefore subject to sanctions,
Ruling at 7-8, 9; however, it decided not to impose sanctions for
those violations.

In conjunction with its conclusion that the

Club/Alamo were guilty of the violations just described, the
Council concluded that it

f,

ha[d] jurisdiction over the parties and

the subject matter involved in this revocation proceeding."
Ruling

at: 7.

On each of these points, the Council plainly

rejected contrary arguments advanced by the Club/Alamo.
With the foregoing in mind, the meaning of the term "Order"
as used in 83-16 § 6.01m. and 87-12 § 15 may now be addressed.
Contrary to the view the City and the district court apparently
adopted, "Order" cannot reasonably be read to include only the
"bare-bones" order issued by the Council (i.e., dismissal of the
action) .

An "Order" necessarily encompasses all the pertinent

factual and legal conclusions that underpin the ultimate result
reached by the Council.

To interpret "Order" in the extremely

narrow fashion proposed by the City and the court would strip the
Council's decision of its essential elements and result in an
8

insulation from judicial review that could not have been intended
by the drafters of the pertinent ordinances.
As for the term "aggrieved/' the court also adopted an
unreasonably narrow construction.

It essentially concluded that/

because the Club/Alamo did not suffer any sanctions concerning
their beer and liquor licenses and business licenses, they were
not "aggrieved" by the Council's order, and that a sanction must
have been imposed against a party by the Council's order before
that party may seek judicial review under 83-16 § 6.01m. or 87-12
§ 15.
The term "aggrieved" is not defined in either ordinance.
However, the Utah Supreme Court has had occasion to construe
language similar to that at issue here.

In noting that a sheriff,

whose decision to discharge one of his deputies had been reversed
by the Merit Commission, enjoyed a statutory right to appeal the
Commission's reversal under Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-20 (1987) , the
Court said:
An "aggrieved p a r t y " must be both a p a r t y to
t h e p r o c e e d i n g and one who i s prejudiced or
a f f e c t e d by t h e o r d e r .
The s h e r i f f in t h i s
c a s e was c l e a r l y an a g g r i e v e d p a r t y .
He
d i s c h a r g e d Deputy Jones.
The M e r i t
Commission's o r d e r r e i n s t a t i n g Deputy Jones
a f f e c t s the s h e r i f f , as he and h i s department
would be r e q u i r e d to work with a person the
s h e r i f f a p p a r e n t l y believed was not q u a l i f i e d
to serve as a deputy s h e r i f f . The s h e r i f f had
a s t a t u t o r y r i g h t to a p p e a l .
Matter

of D i s c h a r g e

(citations omitted).

of

Jones,

720 P.2d 1356, 1360 (Utah 1986)

Applying t h a t d e f i n i t i o n

of

"aggrieved"

to

the i n s t a n t c a s e , along with the proper c o n s t r u c t i o n of the term
9

"Order" discussed above, the Club/Alamo were clearly -aggrieved by
the Council's

order which

included

rulings adverse to the

Club/Alamo on the issues of jurisdiction, preemption, construction
of pertinent ordinances, and guilt concerning alleged violations
of the beer/liquor and business licensing ordinances—matters that
are central to the propriety of the entire revocation proceeding
against the licensees.

The adverse actions of the Council plainly

affected the Club/Alamo's legal rights, such that the Club/Alamo
can be fairly considered "licensee[s] aggrieved by an Order of the
City Council" under
construction

83-16

§ 6.01m. and

87-12 § 15.

This

is consistent with the principles of statutory

interpretation this Court recently applied in construing a city
ordinance in Salem City v. Farnsworth# 753 P.2d 514 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).

Therefore, the district court erred in dismissing the

Club/Alamo's appeal on the ground that they lacked appellate
standing under the relevant Park City ordinances.
Second, the city and the district court devoted

little

attention to the Club/Alamo's alternative claim of jurisdiction
under Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b) (2) .

It is well established lav; in

Utah that, where there is no statute or ordinance specifically
authorizing

judicial

review, a party may seek relief from

arbitrary or unlawful local agency action under Rule 65B(b)(2).
See, e.g., DeBry v. Salt Lake County Board of Appeals, 764 P.2d
627, 628 n.2

(Utah Ct. App. 1988).

Club/Alamo sought in their appeal.

That is precisely what the

Neither the City nor the court

offered anything to demonstrate why jurisdiction would not, in the
10

alternative, lie in the district court under Rule 65B(b)(2) as
explained in DeBry.

And, contrary to what the City and the court

apparently believed, nothing in either Rule 65B(b)(2), § 78-33-1
et seq.i or the relevant case law even suggests that the
Club/Alamo were required to pursue a declaratory judgment action
rather than seek review under Rule 65B(b)(2).

Indeed, in McRae &

DeLand v. Feltch, 669 P.2d 404, 406 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme
Court made clear that the appropriate procedure for challenging
the jurisdiction of a lower tribunal — an issue central to the
instant case—is not a declaratory judgment action, but rather is
a petition

for extraordinary

relief under Rule 653(b)(2).

Moreover, although there does not appear to be a Utah appellate
decision directly on point, it is widely held that a declaratory
relief action is not the appropriate vehicle for review of an
administrative decision when there exists a procedure to appeal
from an administrative ruling.

See, e.g., Tanner Companies v.

Arizona State Land Dept., 142 Ariz. 183, 688 P.2d 1075, 1079-80
(Ariz. App. 1984), and cases cited therein; Ricks Exploration v.
Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., 695 P.2d 498, 502 (Okl. 1984); Selby
Realty Co. v. City of Buenaventura, 10 Cal.3d 110, 109 Cal. Rptr.
799, 514 P.2d 111, 122 (1973).
Finally, the district court's mootness finding misunderstood
both the nature and significance of the relief sought by the
Club/Alamo.

Their appeal sought reversal of the Council's order

on the issues of jurisdiction, preemption, and construction and
application of the pertinent ordinances.
11

This relief clearly can

affect the Club/Alamo's right to be free from the collateral
consequences that could flow from the Council's rulings that the
Club/Alamo had violated 83-16 § 6.01(b) and 87-12 § 15(3)—for
examplef those rulings obviously could affect the Club/Alamo's
ability to renew their beer/liquor licenses (see P.C. Ordin. 83-16
§ 5.11(d) 6) or to defend themselves in a future action for
business license suspension or revocation brought under 87-12 §
15(3) ("front for or the site of illegal activity" provision).

A

case is deemed moot only when the requested relief cannot affect
the rights of the litigants.
42, 44 (Utah 1989).

See Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773 P.2d

Clearly, as just noted, the Club/Alamo's

rights would be significantly affected if the district court were
to grant the requested relief.
166, 167 n.l
exception

Cf. Spain v. Stewart, 639 P.2d

(Utah 1981) (discussing collateral consequences

to the mootness doctrine

in criminal

context).

Therefore, that court erred in dismissing the Club/Alamofs appeal
as moot.

6
P.C. Ordin. 83-16 § 5.11(d) provides in pertinent part:
. . . .

Licenses shall be renewed unless the Council shall find that:
. . .

(d) The l i c e n s e e or h i s employees or agents have been
c o n v i c t e d of or p l e a d [ s i c ] g u i l t y to more than five (5)
v i o l a t i o n s of t h i s ordinance or S t a t e liquor control s t a t u t e s
r e l a t i v e to the conduct of the licensed premises in a single
calendar year preceding the renewal, not including violationby patrons.
12

CONCLUSION
Because the Club/Alamo were aggrieved by the Council's order,
they were properly before the district court on appeal pursuant to
the applicable Park City ordinances.

Alternatively/ the district

court had jurisdiction to reviev; the Council's unlawful actions
under Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b)(2) .
judicial

Finally, because the requested

relief can significantly affect the rights of the

Club/Alamo, the lower court should not have dismissed their appeal
as moot.
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the district court's
order of dismissal and remand the case to that court to conduct
review of the Council's ruling as requested by the Club/Alamo.
/A-—-

RESPECTFULLY submitted this i^2_Z7day of December, 1989.

David B. Thompson
fl
Attorney for Appellants
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'J&UtJ.J?.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

BEFORE THE CITY COUNCIL OF PARK CITY, UTAH

IN RE: REVOCATION OF BEER
AND LIQUOR LICENSE AND
BUSINESS REVENUE LICENSE
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION,
Petitioner

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER
BY THE PARK CITY COUNCIL

v.
THE CLUB, THE ALAMO, LIQUID
ASSETS, INC., THE CLUB/449
MAIN, FOUR FORTY NINE, A NONPROFIT CORP., THERESE M.
LAWTON, KEITH BRONSTEIN, ANN
ALLENDE, MIKE STEMLER, BILL
DAHLQUIST, CHRIST JAMES,
SONNY SUNDQUIST, DOUG
WATCHORN, AND ANY OTHER )
PERSONS CLAIMING A MANAGEMENT OR OWNERSHIP INTEREST
IN THE ABOVE-NAMED ESTABLISHMENTS OR ORGANIZATIONS,
Respondents

NO. 88-001

FINDINGS OF FACT
After considering the recommended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Order by A. Robert Thurman, Licensed Hearing
Examiner, and after hearing arguments of Petitioner and Respondent
at an open meeting on February 23, 1989, being fully advised in the
premises, and good cause appearing, the Park City Council herein
enters its Findings of Fact:
1.

Respondents "The Club" and "The Alamo" constitute a

single business operated in adjoining space, in a single building

OOuo

located at 449 Main Street in Park City. While the City has issued
beer and liquor licenses to each entity separately for revenue
purposes, there is no doubt, and we find, that they are, de facto,
a single business.
2.

There is no doubt, and we find, that "The Club" and

"The Alamo" are unregistered, d.b.a's used by Four Forty-Nine Main,
Inc., a Utah non-profit corporation which is responsible for the
combined establishment known as both "The Club" and "The Alamo".
The board of trustees for Four Forty-Nine Main, Inc., is comprised
of Therese M. Haberkorn (Lawton) , Keith Bronstein, Mike Stemler,
Ann Allende, Bill Dahlquist, Doug Watchorn and Chris James.
3.

The actual operation of the business known as "The

Club" and "The Alamo" is performed by Liquid Assets, Inc., a Utah
for-profit corporation. The Directors of Liquid Assets, Inc., are
Bill Dahlquist, Chris James and Sonny Sundquist.

The officers of

Liquid Assets, Inc., are Therese M. Lawton, president; Keith
Bronstein,

vice-president;

Ann

Allende,

secretary;

and

Mike

Stemler, treasurer.
4o

The Cityfs licensees appear to be both Four Forty-

Nine Main, Inc. and Liquid Assets, Inc., and we so find for the
purposes of this hearing.

The individuals presently associated

with the management of the business known as "The Club" and "The
Alamo" are Therese M. Lawton, Keith Bronstein, Ann Allende, Mike
Stemler, Douglas Watchorn, William Dahlquist, Chris James and Sonny
Sundquist.

Club/Alamo
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5.

Four Forty-Nine Main, Inc., leases space in a

building owned by a partnership called Historic '84-Park City. The
partners of Historic '84-Park City are William Dahlquist, Carl
Redlin, Douglas Watchorn and Milton Stemler, each holding a 25%
interest in the partnership.
6. Milton Stemler is the father of Mark Stemler, and he
acquired his ownership interest in the Historic

'84-Park City

partnership, and thus the leased building, through his son. Mike
Stemler and Ann Allende are the brother and sister, respectively,
of Mark Stemler.
7.

The original owners of Liquid Assets, Inc., were

Cindy David and Mark Stemler, each apparently owning 5,000 shares
of the 10,000 shares authorized.

On November 5, 1985, those two

parties entered into a stock purchase agreement, under the terms
of which Mark Stemler was to buy Cindy David's interest represented
by 5,000 shares of stock for $84,000.00, payable $4,000.00 down,
$6,000.00 on or before May 1, 1986, and the balance in 36 monthly
installments at four percent (4%).
8.

On July 26, 1986, Mark Stemler plead guilty in the

federal district court in Wyoming to charges of Conspiracy to
Distribute Cocaine and Distribution of Cocaine.
to a ten-year term.

He was sentenced

He is presently serving his sentence at the

federal correction facility at Boron, California.
9.

Within days of his arrest on the federal charges,

from the Wyoming jail where he was being held, Mark Stemler
telephoned one Keith Bronstein (hereafter "Bronstein"), an employee
Club/Alamo
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of Liquid Assets, and suggested Bronstein serve as a nominee during
Mark Stemler's incarceration—that is, appear as ostensible owner,
manage the business, and turn it back over to Mark Stemler at the
end of his term.
10.
Haberkorn

Bronstein testified that he declined the offer.

According to the testimony of Therese Lawton, nee

(hereafter "Lawton"), presumably

shortly after Mark

Stemler•s conversation with Bronstein, Mark Stemler called Lawton,
again from the Wyoming jail.

He protested his innocence on the

drug charges and offered to sell his interest in Liquid Assets,
Inc., for a sum to be agreed on later, together with an option to
buy it back at the end of his incarceration for the same amount
Lawton may have paid him in the meantime.

She claims she then

consulted her father, a CPA, on the purchase, and also sought and
received legal advice.
11.

She is vague as to the advice received.

According to Lawton, approximately six weeks later,

she got a second call from Mark Stemler, at which time he admitted
he was guilty of the drug charges. According to Lawton, she became
angry at Stemlerfs deception, cursed him, and told him she would
not resell the corporation to him. Lawton testified that they then
concluded an oral agreement over the phone. The terms of the oral
agreement, according to Lawton, are as follows:

Lawton was not

required to pay any money down, but she was supposed to pay Mark
Stemlerfs attorney's fees, such personal bills as Mark Stemler
designated during the time of his incarceration, including VISA
bills, and keep up the installment payments to Cindy David; when
Mark Stemler is released from prison, Lawton is to pay him the
Club/Alamo
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difference between $93,000, the agreed-upon purchase price, and the
expenditures she has made on his behalf in the meantime.
12. According to Lawtonfs testimony, since that time she
has carried out the terras outlined in the preceding paragraph. The
agreement has never been reduced to writing, and no stock share
certificates have been transferred.
13.

From the record before us, it appears that Mark

Stemler is currently a 50% shareholder and, therefore, a 50% owner
of Liquid Assets, Inc.

While the Hearing Examiner was convinced

that Mr. Stemler had orally contracted to sell his interest in
Liquid Assets, Inc., to Therese Lawton, there is no evidence of the
consummation of that sale in the record before us, nor is there
evidence of the consummation of the stock purchase agreement
between Cindy David and Mark Stemler.

We find that the record as

to the ownership of Liquid Assets, Inc., and Four Forty-Nine Main,
Inc., is incomplete, and therefore make no finding with regard to
the ownership of the businesses known as "The Club" and "The
Alamo".
14.
through

During the five-month period from November, 1986,

March,

"Bernards"),

an

1987,
officer

Celeste

Paquette

operating

under

Bernards
cover

for

(hereafter
the Utah

Metropolitan Narcotics Strike Force, was active in Park City
investigating illicit drug activities in the area. Her activities
culminated in the conviction or guilty pleas, under State statue,
not Park City Ordinance, of a substantial number of persons, among
whom are certain employees and customers of The Club/Alamo.
Club/Alamo
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She

stated she concentrated her efforts at The Club/Alamo because she
found

that

purchases.

establishment

the

easiest

at which

to make drug

She purchased from, or was directed to sellers by

doormen and other employees or agents of the establishment.
15.

The apparently most egregious drug activity carried

out on the premises was the handiwork of one Donald Riegelsperger,
who, during the period in question, as a concessionaire, operated
the food service on the premises*

Both Lawton and Riegelsperger

testified that they considered him an independent contractor.
Lawton, however, directly or through Bronstein, exercised several
indicia of control casting doubt on Riegelsperger's independence.
At the very least, he was the establishment's agent, and we so
find.
16o

During the period Bernards was active, Riegelsperger

was conducting a flourishing retail cocaine business in conjunction
with the food operation.

He employed one Jody Jane Young as a

waitress, and she served Riegelsperger's entire product line.

If

Riegelsperger was an agent of The Club/Alamo, then obviously Young
was a sub«agent, and we so find.

Both Riegelsperger and Young

plead guilty to a State charge of drug distribution.
17.

Bernards attempted

a drug purchase, ultimately

aborted, through one Chris James, at that time a bartender at The
Club/Alamo, and listed as a director of Liquid Assets.

James1

whereabouts are at present unknown; he is no longer employed at The
Club/Alamo.

He has not yet, to date, been convicted on any drug

charge stemming from Bernards' activities.
Club/Alamo
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18.

Bernards also purchased drugs from or through Eugene

Herrera, Chris Pederson# and Bruce Fecteau, all concededly employed
as doormen on one or more occasions during Bernards1 activity.
Herrera, Pederson and Fecteau all plead guilty to State drug
charges•
19. In addition to the above-named individuals, Bernards
made a number of drug purchases from or through customers of The
Club/Alamo she met on the premises.

These purchases took place

both on and off the premises of The Club/Alamo.
20.

The record reflects substantial evidence and we find

that the operation of The Club and The Alamo have

posed a

significant law enforcement problem in Park City.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Park City
Council now enters the following Conclusions of Law:
1.

The City Council has jurisdiction over the parties

and the subject matter involved in this revocation proceeding.
2.

The Order to Show Cause brought by the City Manager

is appropriate

in

form,

and

all

requirements

of

Park City

Ordinances regarding the bringing of this Order to Show Cause have
been met.
3. The Hearing Examiner in this case has concluded that
Ordinance 83-16, Section 6.01(b), "was intended to apply when
licensees are convicted under Section 7.01," and that therefore
sanctions must be predicated upon a misdemeanor conviction under
City Ordinance,

rather than a felony

Club/Alamo
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statutes which proscribe the same conduct.

The City Council

rejects this conclusion, for it was clearly not the Councils
intention to ignore felony convictions of federal or state drug
crimes occurring on City-licensed premises and take action only on
misdemeanor convictions. The facts are that three employees of the
licensee and two agents of the licensee were convicted of or plead
guilty to felony drug crimes which took place on the licensed
premises.

The Council concludes that those facts constitute the

grounds for suspension or

revocation contemplated by Section

6.01(b) of Ordinance 83-16.
4. The Hearing Examiner in this case has concluded that
"Petitioner,

successfully

to

predicate

any

revocation

upon

[Ordinance 83-16] Section 6.01(e), bears the burden of proving by
a preponderance of the evidence that Lawton knew of the drug
activities uncovered by (Agent) Bernards." The City Council holds
that Section 6.01(e) provides a basis for license revocation
separate from that set forth in Section 6.01(b) and does require
knowledge of the licensee of the proscribed activities of employees
and agents. The City Council concludes that the evidence does not
show knowledge by Bronstein or Lawton of the drug transactions
which took place at "The Club" and "The Alamo" and that there is
therefore no basis for sanctions based on Section 6.01(e) of
Ordinance 83-16.
5.

The City Council agrees with the Hearing Examinerfs

conclusion that had Mark Stemler been found to be licensee, the
City would have the grounds for license revocation under Ordinance
Club/Alamo
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83-16, Section 6.01(d). Given that the Council has made no finding
as to the ownership of Liquid Assets, Inc., or Four Forty-Nine
Main, Inc.,the City Council concludes that there exists no present
basis

for revocation or suspension under Section

6.01(d) of

Ordinance 83-16.
6.

The Hearing Examiner suggests that Ordinance 87-12,

Section 15(3), which provides that a business revenue license may
be revoked or suspended by the City Council when the City Council
finds that "the business is a front for or the site of illegal
activity,11 requires a showing of intent on the part of a licensee
to deceive or defraud the public or City.

The City Council

disagrees, and holds that "The Club" and "The Alamo" were the site
of the illegal activities described in Findings of Fact No.'s 14,
15, 16, 17, 18 and 19, within the meaning of Section 15 of
Ordinance 87-12.

2£D£B
As is apparent from the foregoing Conclusions of Law, the
City

Council

strongly

disagrees

with

the

Hearing

Examiner's

analysis of the meaning and application of the City's Beer and
Liquor Licensing and Business Licensing Ordinances. Nevertheless,
the City Council acknowledges that it requested that the Hearing
Examiner make both Findings of Fact based on the evidence presented
and Conclusions of Law based on application of the facts to the
City's Ordinances.

Based on equitable considerations and on the

feeling that no useful purpose would be served by levying sanctions
against the establishments known as "The Club" and "The Alamo", and
Club/Alamo
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3 1989

pursuant to Section 15(1) of Ordinance 87-12 and Section 6.01(1)
of Ordinance 83-16, the City Council dismisses the Order to Show
Cause in the instant matter and orders that the temporary licenses
issued wThe Club" and "The Alamo" be reinstated on the same terms
and conditions as applied to all other City business and liquor
licensees.
CITY COUNCIL OE/PARK PITY

Hal ~W.~ Taylor

/

Ray ^6hnson/

Bradley A.^^licn

^

Ann HacQuoidi

Kristen Rogers /

James Sarfty"
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APPENDIX B

P.C. Ordin. 87-12 § 15:
Any license issued under this ordinance may be
revoked or suspended by the City Council when the City
Council finds that: (1) the licensee has filed false or
fraudulent license tax returns, (2) the licensee has been
convicted of or plead [sic] guilty to or paid fines or
settlements in criminal or civil actions brought by the
State Tax Commission for the collection of, or arising
from the non-payment of, taxes imposed by the state of
Utah, (3) the business is a front for or the site of
illegal activity, (4) the business has been the subject
of a sufficient number of consumer complaints that it has
the effect of tarnishing the reputation of other businesses
within Park City.

APPENDIX C

.v '...
NO.

FILED *

JAMES W. CARTER, #0586
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
P. O. BOX 1480
445 MARSAC AVENUE
PARK CITY, UTAH 84060
TELEPHONE (801) 649-9413

__JUL 25 J9(W
Cleri of Summit County

ay.

Ulfi'

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN RE: REVOCATION OF BEER
AND LIQUOR LICENSE AND
BUSINESS REVENUE LICENSE
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION,
Petitioner-Appellee
v.
THE CLUB, THE ALAMO, LIQUID
ASSETS, INC., THE CLUB/449
MAIN, FOUR FORTY NINE, A NONPROFIT CORP., THERESE M.
LAWTON, KEITH BRONSTEIN, ANN
ALLENDE, MIKE STEMLER, BILL
DAHLQUIST, CHRIS JAMES,
SONNY SUNDQUIST, DOUG
WATCHORN, AND ANY OTHER
PERSONS CLAIMING A MANAGEMENT OR OWNERSHIP INTEREST
IN THE ABOVE-NAMED ESTABLISHMENTS OR ORGANIZATIONS,
Respondents-Appellants

ORDER

NO.

10213

HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK

The Motion to Dismiss of Appellee Park City Municipal
Corporation having come on for consideration before the aboveentitled court; Appellants being represented by David B Thompson
and Joseph E. Tesch, and Appellee being represented by James W.

Carter; and the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of
Park City Municipal

Corporation's Motion

to Dismiss and the

Response to Appellee's Motion to Dismiss on file herein having been
reviewed by the Court, the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction
of the appeal for the reason that appellants lack standing to
appeal and that the issues sought to be raised on appeal herein are
moot.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, that the Appeal

from the

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order entered by the Park
City Council in a License Revocation Proceeding on file herein be
dismissed, with each party to bear its/own costs.
DATED this

day of July, 1989.
BY M E ffiOURT

lonorable.J. -Donnio Frodorick
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NOTICE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on July fl-Uh

1989, a true and

correct copy of the foregoing Order was mailed, postage prepaid,
to:
David B. Thompson, Esq.
Joseph E. Tesch, Esq.
Attorneys for Appellants
P. 0. Box 3390
Park City, Utah 84060
Anita L. Sheldon, City Recorder
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APPENDIX D

)

JAMES W. CARTER, #0586
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
P. 0. BOX 1480
445 MARSAC AVENUE
PARK CITY, UTAH 84060
TELEPHONE (801) 649-9413
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN RE: REVOCATION OF BEER
AND LIQUOR LICENSE AND
BUSINESS REVENUE LICENSE
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION,
Petitioner-Appellee
v.
THE CLUB, THE ALAMO, LIQUID
ASSETS, INC., THE CLUB/449
MAIN, FOUR FORTY NINE, A NONPROFIT CORP., THERESE M.
LAWTON, KEITH BRONSTEIN, ANN
ALLENDE, MIKE STEMLER, BILL
DAHLQUIST, CHRIS JAMES,
SONNY SUNDQUIST, DOUG
WATCHORN, AND ANY OTHER
PERSONS CLAIMING A MANAGEMENT OR OWNERSHIP INTEREST
IN THE ABOVE-NAMED ESTABLISHMENTS OR ORGANIZATIONS,
Respondents-Appellants

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION'S MOTION TO
DISMISS
NO. 10213
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING
As set forth in the appeal of The Club, The Alamo, et
al, (hereinafter collectively the Club/Alamo), this action arises
out of a beer and liquor license and business license revocation
proceeding initiated by the City Manager of Park City before the

City Council of Park City,

That proceeding culminated

in a

document styled Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order by
the Park City Council, which was attached to the Club/Alamo1s
appeal as Appendix A.

The Order of the City Council, in its

entirety, reads as follows:
As is apparent from the foregoing conclusions of law, the
City Council strongly disagrees with the Hearing
Examiner's analysis of the meaning and application of the
City's beer and liquor licensing and business licensing
ordinances. Nevertheless, the City Council acknowledges
that it requested that the Hearing Examiner make both
findings of fact based on the evidence presented and
conclusions of law based on application of the facts to
the City's ordinances. Based on equitable considerations
and on the feeling that no useful purpose would be served
by levying sanctions against the establishments known as
"The Club" and "The Alamo", and pursuant to Section 15(1)
of Ordinance 87-12 and Section 6.01(1) of Ordinance 8316, the City Council dismisses the Order to Show Cause
in the instant matter and orders that the temporary
licenses issued to "The Club" and "The Alamo" be
reinstated on the same terms and conditions as applied
to all other City business and liquor licensees.
NATURE OF THE CASE
The Club/Alamo has brought this appeal "from the findings
of fact, conclusions of law and order" of the City Council,
invoking jurisdiction under Park City Ordinance 83-16 § 6.01(m),
Park City Ordinance 87-12

§ 15, or alternatively under Rule

65B(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Park City Ordinance 83-16 § 6.01(m) provides that "Any
licensee aggrieved by an Order of the City Council...may maintain
an action for relief..." [emphasis added]. Park City Ordinance 8712 § 15 contains language identical to Ordinance 83-16 regarding
appeal.

Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs

2

extraordinary writs, and provides that "where no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy exists, relief may be obtained..•under
these rules...".

Subparagraph

(b)(2) provides:

"Appropriate

relief may be granted: (2) where an inferior tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction
or abused its discretion;"
The Club/Alamo's "appeal" is in reality a prayer for a
declaratory

determination

that

the

City's

license

revocation

process is ultra vires and that its ordinances are preempted and/or
unconstitutional, coupled with the request that this Court rewrite
the Council's Conclusions of Law.

However, the Club/Alamo has

styled this action as an appeal in order to invoke the Small
Business Equal Access to Justice Act which provides that a small
business is entitled to an award of costs and attorney's fees if
it "prevails" in an "appeal" of a business regulatory action
undertaken by the City "without substantial justification" (Utah
Code Ann. § 78-27a-l, et seq.). The actual relief requested by the
Club/Alamo, however, is declaratory although the Club/Alamo has not
plead the Declaratory Judgments Act. Park City's Motion to Dismiss
is entirely in response to the "appeal" of the Club/Alamo and does
not

constitute

a

substantive

response

to

the

statutory

and

constitutional issues raised.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Club/Alamo clearly is not aggrieved by the Order of
the

City

Council

dismissing

the Order

to Show

Cause.

The

Club/Alamo wants to "appeal" the Council's Conclusions of Law and
3

"appeal" the City's license revocation procedure when neither of
those matters is appealable.
Park City's own ordinances and the rules of appellate
standing,

mootness

and

justiciability

disallow

appeals

by

prevailing parties. There is simply nothing for the Club/Alamo to
appeal from. The Club/Alamo lacks standing to appeal because they
are not aggrieved by the Order of the City Council. Further, this
appeal is moot and presents no justiciable issues for resolution
by the court.

This appeal should be dismissed with leave for the

Club/Alamo to raise whatever issues it deems important in a proper
action.
POINT I
The Club/Alamo lacks standing to appeal
the Order of the Park City Council for the reason
that thev are not aggrieved
I n Society of Professional Journalists, Utah Chapter, et al, v. Honorable 7. Robert

Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166 (1987), the Utah Supreme Court set forth the
rules of appellate standing.

In that case, the court considered

a petition for an extraordinary writ pursuant to Rule 65B U.R.C.P.,
seeking to overturn an order of the District Court filed by an
entity not a party to that proceeding.

While the facts in the

instant case are different, the court's ruling with regard to
appellate standing does apply here.

The court held:

"Our

generally stated standing rule is that a Plaintiff must have
suffered 'some distinct and palpable injury that gives him [or her]
a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute1" (at 1170).
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In referring to appellate standing, the court reasoned:
On appeal, a party whose standing is challenged must show
that he or she had standing under the traditional test
in the original proceeding before the District Court,
[cases cited] In addition, an appellant generally must
show both that he or she was a party or privy to the
action below and that he or she is aggrieved by that
courtf s i udgment [cases cited].
Satisfaction of
analogous requirements therefore will be necessary to
demonstrate appellate standing and keep appellate review
by writ on a par with appellate review by appeal, (at
1171, emphasis added)
Based upon its analysis, the court held as follows:
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that to demonstrate
appellate standing, one using a petition for a writ as
a vehicle to obtain appellate type review of a trial
court's ruling, must show the following:
(i) the
petitioner had standing to proceed before the District
Court, (ii) the petitioner is challenging the District
Court's ruling adverse to him or her, (iii) the
petitioner appeared and presented his or her claim to
that court. If the petitioner fails to establish any one
of these standing requirements, this court will not
consider the claims, (at 1172, emphasis added)
The Club/Alamo has failed to show that it has appellate
standing because the challenged ruling is not adverse to them. It
is clear that the Club/Alamo has suffered no "distinct and palpable
injury" by reason of the Council's dismissal.

The Club/Alamo may

not be pleased by the license revocation proceeding, but they
simply are not aggrieved by the Council's order. The Club/Alamo's
actual argument is that the City Council had no constitutional or
statutorily authorized license revocation procedure in the first
place, and that commencement of the license revocation proceedings
was ultra vire, unconstitutional and preempted by state law. Those
would be an interesting inquiries in a declaratory action but it
has absolutely nothing at all to do with the appealability of the
5

Council's order.

As noted by the Utah Supreme Court in Terracor vs.

Utah Board of State Lands, 716 P. 2d 796 (1986), the issue of appellate
standing is jurisdictional, and may be raised sua sponte by the
court even if not plead by the parties.

The Order entered by the

City Council was the order prayed for by the Club/Alamo and
deprived them, as a matter of law, of standing to appeal it.
Because the Club/Alamo lacks appellate standing, this court lacks
jurisdiction to consider this appeal, and it should be dismissed.
POINT II
This court should decline jurisdiction because
the appeal is moot and presents no justiciable controversy
Quite simply, the appeal of the Club/Alamo is moot. The
establishments have continued to operate, uninterrupted, from the
time of the filing of the Order to Show Cause through the present
date.

The Order to Show Cause was dismissed by the City Council

and the "The Club" and "The Alamo" are presently operating under
valid and subsisting beer and liquor and business licenses issued
by Park City.
There exists a clear judicial policy against giving
advisory opinions even in declaratory actions.

See, for example,

Merhish vs. H. A. Folsom & Associates, 646 P.2d 731 (Utah, 1982) and Backman vs.

Salt Lake County, 375 P.2d 756 (Utah, 1962).
The Utah Supreme Court in Duran v. Morris, 635 P. 2d 43 (1981) ,
held "If the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of
the litigants, the case is moot and a court will normally refrain
from adjudicating it on the merits."
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(at 45) There is nothing the

court can do with the Council's order which will affect the rights
of the litigants except reverse it.

Neither party is requesting

reversal.
While

the

parties

continue

to

have

a

relationship

governed by the ordinances of Park City, the factual circumstance
giving rise to the City's Order to Show Cause and the Club/Alamo's
potential

liability have been rendered moot by the Council's

dismissal. The relief that the Club/Alamo seeks has nothing to do
with the order of dismissal, but is an attack on the entire license
revocation process.

Such an attack should not be countenanced in

the guise of an appeal, but should be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
The Club/Alamo has no springboard to launch an appeal of
the City Council's order because they prevailed. Any citizen with
standing may challenge the City's regulatory process at any time
through

a

declaratory

action,

but

the

license

revocation

proceedings are over. The relief requested by the Club/Alamo would
properly constitute a new cause of action, but not an appeal. Park
City requests that the court find that it lacks jurisdiction of the
appeal of the Club/Alamo and that it be dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this 1st day of June, 1989.

Jamjes W. Carterr-^Attorney^ for
Park City Municipal Corporation
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